This paper provides new field evidence on risk preferences over small stakes. Using unique population and survey data on deductible choice in Dutch universal health insurance, we find that risk preferences are a dominant factor in decision making. In fact, our results indicate that risk preferences are both statistically and quantitatively more significant in explaining deductible choice behavior than risk type. This finding contrasts with classical expected utility theory, as it implies risk neutrality over small stakes. More recently developed reference-dependent utility models, however, can rationalize risk aversion over small stakes, on account of loss aversion and narrow framing.
Introduction
The theory of choice under uncertainty has been at the core of economic research ever since the seminal work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1948) and Friedman and Savage (1948) . Empirical evidence on actual choices is, however, still surprisingly scarce. Although there have been numerous analyses of laboratory experiments, game shows and hypothetical gambles, which have greatly enhanced our understanding of individual choice behavior, the same features that make such studies valuable actually limit their real-life applicability. As Loewenstein (1999) argues, experimental studies are vulnerable in terms of external validity, i.e. to what extent the results carry over to reallife. In that respect, analyses of actual choices have a clear advantage.
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In this paper we analyze a certain choice that adults in the Netherlands make on a yearly basis.
Specifically, we investigate deductible choice behavior in Dutch universal health insurance with special focus on the significance of risk preferences. In insurance policies, the deductible is the amount a policyholder has to pay out-of-pocket before the insurance company will cover the remaining costs. Since deductibles are small-scale risks compared to lifetime wealth, expected utility theory predicts that individuals choose their deductible in a risk-neutral fashion. Under risk neutrality, expected value drives decision-making and differences in risk attitudes do not play a role. Arrow (1971) called this the local risk neutrality of expected utility theory. Rabin (2000) brought the issue of local risk neutrality to the fore again. He showed that if the only reason consumers are risk averse is diminishing marginal utility of wealth, which is what expected utility models assume, then consumers should be virtually risk neutral over stakes in the hundreds or even thousands of U.S. dollars.
Contrary to the prediction of expected utility theory, there is increasing empirical evidence that people can be significantly averse to small risks. The majority of this evidence comes from experiments that are conducted under controlled laboratory conditions (e.g. Holt and Laury 2002; Barberis, Huang, and 3 Thaler 2006; Harrison and Rutström 2008) . Evidence from real market settings is scarcer. There are a few existing field studies, however. Cichetti and Dubin (1994) study the demand for telephone wiring protection in the U.S, which is surely a small risk with own payments maximized to $55. Cohen and Einav (2007) estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in Israeli auto insurance contracts. Sydnor (2010) uses data on deductible choices in U.S. homeowner's insurance to calibrate a bound for the implied level of risk aversion. While each of these studies uses the expected utility framework to estimate risk preferences over modest risk, the results differ. Both Cichetti and Dubin (1994) and Cohen and Einav (2007) report relatively low levels of risk aversion, while Sydnor (2010) finds that under expected utility theory only extreme measures of risk aversion can rationalize the choice for costly low deductibles.
Our study contributes to the existing literature on risk preferences over small stakes in a number of dimensions. First, while related studies investigate deductible choice of policyholders in a particular insurance market, we investigate a universal insurance market, which covers the majority of health risks of all Dutch residents. Hence, our results are generalizable to the overall Dutch population.
Second, we combine unique population data with representative survey data, which allows us to give a relatively detailed evaluation of deductible choice behavior in the Dutch universal health insurance market. The population data include information on deductible choice, premium rebates and out-ofpocket expenditures. The survey data are from CentERpanel and have been used by others, including Van Rooij, Kool, and Prast (2007) . An important feature of our survey dataset is that it includes good proxies of both risk type and risk preferences. This brings us to our third contribution, namely that we use direct measures of risk preferences to explain deductible choice. Related studies infer risk tolerance parameters by assuming expected utility of wealth maximization and a specific utility function. Hence, this paper also fits within a growing stream of research that measures risk preferences from survey data and relates these direct measures of risk tolerance to actual consumer behavior (e.g. Barsky et al. 1997; Paiella 2005, 2008; Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry 2008) .
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As the Dutch universal health insurance market is highly regulated, it is ideal for studying the role of risk preferences in the domain of small risks. The so-called basic health insurance policy is mandatory to all Dutch residents. As a result, consumer choice is restricted to choosing a health insurer and a deductible-rebate package with that insurer. Individuals that opt for a higher deductible have the same health plan as everybody else, yet they voluntarily expose themselves to a small amount of financial risk. In 2008, the year which we study, residents could choose a voluntary deductible from six alternatives, ranging from €0 till €500 (roughly $650) in stages of €100. For a nonzero voluntary deductible policyholders receive a premium rebate that is independent of health status and risk (Van Kleef et al. 2008) . Consequently, asymmetric information is effectively guaranteed and the analysis can focus on the demand-side. Nonetheless, in the empirical work we verify that rebate differences between insurers do not influence our results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the basic health insurance market in the Netherlands and discusses deductible choice and expenditure patterns that emerge from population data. These data show that people by and large choose the lowest deductible, though young men have low expected out-of-pocket expenditures and would benefit, in expected value terms, from higher levels of deductibility. Section 3 outlines our empirical approach and provides underpinning for our proxies of risk type and risk preferences. Section 4 describes the survey dataset and gives first indications of a relationship between attitudes towards risk and deductible choice in our sample of Dutch adults. Section 5 presents the empirical result. By way of preview, we find that risk preferences are both statistically and quantitatively more significant in explaining deductible choice behavior than risk characteristics, which contrasts with standard expected utility of wealth theory. Potential explanations outside the canonical utility model are discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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Market description and choice patterns in the population
The implementation of the Health Insurance Act in 2006 significantly changed the Dutch market for health insurance. After decades of price and capacity control by government, the Dutch healthcare system shifted from supply-side regulation to managed competition ( Van de Ven and Schut 2008) .
The aim of this shift was to make healthcare more cost efficient and improve quality. However, to guarantee that every Dutch citizen has equal access to essential good quality care, the government introduced specific limitations to market functioning. As a result, the Dutch healthcare system has both public and private aspects (Okma 2009 ).
Since 2006, residents in the Netherlands have been obliged to purchase a specific health insurance plan, the basic health insurance policy, from a private insurance company. Each year, the exact composition of this basic package is determined by the government. Generally, it includes care provided in hospitals or by general practitioners and specialists, prescription drugs, maternity care, obstetrics, technical aids and dental care for children (Van Kleef et al. 2008) . Though insurers are free to offer preferred provider policies, the large majority of insurers cover all healthcare suppliers. As a consequence, the basic health insurance plan is fairly close to being a homogeneous product.
To curtail redundant healthcare consumption arising from moral hazard, the Dutch government initially arranged for both a no-claim refund and a voluntary deductible. The no-claim refund was applicable to adult residents in 2007. If total personal claims were between €0 and € 255, the individual would get the no-claim refund minus the actual claims.
2 On top of this, residents could choose a deductible from six alternatives, ranging from €0 till €500 in stages of €100. Choosing higher levels of deductibility leads to more financial risk, for which consumers are compensated via premium rebates. In 2008, the no-claim refund was replaced by a mandatory deductible of €150. The six voluntary deductible alternatives remained the same. 
Figure 1 Average out-of-pocket basic health expenditures Dutch population in 2008
Notes: Out-of-pocket expense data are from Vektis, the healthcare information centre established by Dutch health insurers. Averages are calculated for all residents, including all possible voluntary deductible levels. 95% of the adult population has a voluntary deductible of €0, however.
Based on the average expenditure patterns in Figure 1 , one would expect that young people in general and young males in particular are more inclined to choose a nonzero voluntary deductible. Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case, though the differences are relatively small.
To assess the attractiveness of choosing a nonzero deductible in expected value terms, average out-ofpocket expenditures are of little use. Fortunately we do not only have averages of the out-of-pocket expenditure distributions but also deciles, which can be used to this end. Table A1 in the Appendix gives the out-of-pocket expenditure data we use in this counterfactual exercise. These data describe the expenditure patterns of Dutch adults with a €0 voluntary deducible, i.e. 95% of the adult population. In this paragraph we explain how deciles of the out-of-pocket expenditure distributions can be used to determine an upper bound of the expected additional costs of increasing the voluntary deductible from €0 to €500. Note that we speak of additional expenditures, since these expenditures come on top of the out-of-pocket expenses under the mandatory deductible of €150. Define decile number x as the lowest decile of a certain age-gender expenditure distribution for which actual out-of-pocket expenditures equal the total deductible of €150. For individuals in this age-gender group, an upper bound of the expected additional costs from choosing the maximum deductible is then €500*(1.1-0.1x). This method leads to an upper bound of expected out-of-pocket expenditures for two reasons.
First, it assumes that the (10-x)*10% of the age-gender group that had out-of-pocket expenses equal to the actual deductible of €150 would have had the maximum out-of-pocket expenses of €650 with a voluntary deductible of €500. Second, it assumes that the mass of the expenditures distribution between deciles x-1 and x is concentrated infinitely close to decile x. While there is no reason to believe that these assumptions strictly hold, making these assumptions enables us to identify groups in the Dutch population for which a voluntary deductible of €500 would be attractive in expected value terms, even if the expected additional expenditures are overestimated.
An example may further clarify our procedure. For males aged 40-44 years with an actual voluntary deductible of €0, the 7th decile is the lowest decile for which out-of-pocket expenses are €150 (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Consequently, we know that at least 60% of the males in this age group had actual out-of-pocket expenditures that were lower than the mandatory deductible of €150. An upper bound of the expected additional expenditures from choosing a voluntary deductible of €500 is then €200 for this population group. The expected additional costs are lower than the average premium rebate of €211 (see Table 1 ), making a voluntary deductible attractive with risk neutral preferences.
Using the procedure described above, we have calculated upper bounds of the expected additional expenditures from increasing the voluntary deductible from €0 to €500 for different age-gender groups. Figure 2 presents the results. For comparison reasons, we have also included in Figure 2 information on the range of premium rebates that were offered for a voluntary deductible of €500 as well as the population distribution of males and females over these age cohorts.
From Figure 2 we infer that for the majority of the population, premium rebates were probably too low to make a voluntary deductible of €500 attractive with standard preferences. Hence, a potential explanation for the low appetite for nonzero voluntary deductibles in Dutch basic health insurance is the level of the premium rebates. That being so, a €500 deductible does seem attractive for relatively young men (aged 44 and under). Their expected additional costs from raising their voluntary deductible with €500 are certainly lower (since we calculated upper bounds) than the average premium rebate of €211. In practice, however, only 8% of the 2.7 million men aged 20-44 years chose a voluntary deductible higher than €0 in 2008 (2007 figures are similar). Note that for male adults of 29 years and younger, the calculated upper bound of expected additional expenditures is even lower (€150), which makes a voluntary deductible of €500 even more attractive. Still just 8% of the nearly 1 million men aged 20-29 years held a nonzero voluntary deductible (see Table 2 ). Hence, the population data on out-of-pocket expenditures indicate that risk aversion holds young men back to choose a nonzero voluntary deductible. Note: Out-of-pocket expenditure data are from Vektis, the healthcare information centre established by Dutch health insurers. Data on premium rebates offered are from the Dutch healthcare authority (see also Table 1 ).
Upper bounds of the expected additional expenditures are calculated as described in the text.
Empirical approach
Modeling deductible choice in an empirical setting can be quite challenging. It requires a detailed understanding of the risks that are insured, the features of the contracts traded and the exact distribution of information between buyers and sellers (Chiappori and Salanié 2008) . If insurers have information on their (would-be) policyholders and they are allowed to use this information in their pricing, the estimation methodology should correct for that. While early studies such as Dahlby (1983 Dahlby ( , 1992 and Puelz and Snow (1994) did not have full access to insurers' information, recent works such as Cohen (2005) and Saito (2006) are based on all data from the relevant insurance company.
Thanks to the institutional features of universal health insurance in the Netherlands, our empirical approach can be relatively straightforward. As health insurers are obliged to accept every eligible applicant at community-rated premiums, asymmetric information is effectively guaranteed. When information is asymmetrically distributed between insurers and policyholders, risk type is an important potential driver of deductible choice. Indeed, with community-rated premium rebates, both theory and available empirical evidence predict adverse selection, which means that high risk individuals choose a low deductible, and vice versa (literature reviews are provided by Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000; and Cohen and Siegelmann 2010 İ is (thus) assumed to follow a normal distribution.
We will now describe the explanatory variables in Equation (1), which are all lagged one year as deductibles are chosen ex-ante.
Risk is a vector of risk variables, two of which are age and gender.
In Section 2 we have shown that there are distinct expenditure differences between males and females, and that out-of-pocket expenditures by and large increase with age. As the gender expenditure difference is most pronounced at young ages, a dummy for young men (which is 1 for men aged 44 and under, and 0 otherwise) is also included. As a group, young men have the lowest out-of-pocket expenditures and are therefore expected to be more inclined to choose a nonzero voluntary deductible. Note that gender is also a potential explanatory variable for heterogeneity in risk tolerance levels. Indeed, Barsky et al. (1997) and Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Jonker (2002) find that women are significantly more risk averse than men. Although we control for differences in risk aversion in our regression analyses, it is possible that, to some extent, risk preferences are still picked up by the gender dummy.
Besides age and gender, we use self-assessed health status (SAHS) and number of GP visits as risk proxies. SAHS is a subjective risk measure and is generally regarded to be a good predictor of future health conditions (e.g. Gerdtham et al. 1997; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1994) . Moreover, like all subjective measures, SAHS has the advantage of strictly reflecting information known to the consumer. Consequently, unknown aspects of one's health condition -which by definition cannot play a role in deductible choice -are rightly ignored. The question providing information on SAHS is formulated as follows: 'What is your health like in general?,' with five response categories ranging from 'excellent' to 'poor'. A potential drawback of SAHS is that survey respondents may implicitly assess their health relative to their age category (Buchmueller et al. 2009; Doiron, Jones and Savage 2008) . To address this concern, we also have SAHS interact with age. GP visits are included as a risk measure, although they are not subject to out-of-pocket payments. The rationale for including this variable is that a visit to the GP increases the probability of other healthcare use and thus out-ofpocket payments. For example, GPs give prescriptions for medications and refer patients to specialists, both leading to out-of-pocket expenses up to the deductible amount.
The second vector of explanatory variables in Equation (1) X , which controls heterogeneity in, for instance, education and number of children. These and other variables are described in the next section.
Survey data
We use individual level data on CentERpanel members that have been collected through internet surveys of CentERdata. 6 The CentERpanel was established in 1991 and consists of over 2,000
households. the lowest voluntary deductible is high (84%), yet lower than in the population (95%). This difference in choice patterns between the sample and the population is significant at the 99% confidence level.
Since our sample consists of financial decision makers, who by definition have greater interest in financial issues such as deductible choice in health insurance, a higher fraction of nonzero voluntary deductibles seems logical. Note that non-response is another potential explanation for the differences between the sample and population distribution of deductible choice. 8 We go further into the issue of non-response below. The individual level deductible choice data from our October 2008 survey were merged with existing DNB Household Survey (DHS) data, covering the same individuals. The DHS data include the discussed risk and risk preference proxies, as well as several other personal characteristics that are used as explanatory variables in the estimations. These other characteristics include number of children, whether the respondent has a partner (yes=1), living area (major urban=1) and highest education (1-6 scale, 6=university). After dropping observations with missing values for one or more of the explanatory variables, our dataset consists of 947 observations for 2008. Though selection leads to a reduction in the sample size of 291 observations (24%), Figure 3 shows that the sample distribution of deductible choice is not markedly affected. VII. Focusing first on the averages after selection, we observe significant differences between those who chose a voluntary deductible larger than €0 (Column II) and those that did not (Column I).
Consumers with a nonzero voluntary deductible are younger (though not significantly so), are more likely to be (young) males, bring fewer visits to the GP and typically regard themselves healthier than those with the lowest voluntary deductible. Hence, adverse selection appears relevant. The insignificance of the age difference is somewhat odd though, since out-of-pocket health expenses clearly increase over the years. Consumers with above average deductibles are significantly more risk tolerant: not only towards financial risk but also towards health risk and job risk. Among those with a voluntary deductible, the proportion of daily smokers and self-employed is significantly higher.
However, the proportion of daily drinkers does not vary by deductible choice, nor does the portfolio share of stocks. Wealth and income appear quite important to deductible choice, even though the size of the deductibles is very small compared to the size of these variables.
Columns IV and V of Table 3 show the sample means (after selection) of respondents and surveyed panelists (including non-respondents), respectively. Since there is not much divergence between the two groups, it seems that non-response bias does not appear to be a problem here. Importantly, the level of education of respondents is not significantly different from that of non-respondents. Accordingly, cognitive ability does not seem to drive the willingness to respond. Columns VI and VII indicate for the full sample, thus before selection, that respondents are significantly older than nonrespondents. In line with this, the share of young men is significantly lower among respondents. Since we account for age in the regression analysis, an age difference between respondents and non-18 respondents does not introduce nonresponse bias by itself. 9 Note finally that the fraction of males among our panelists (before selection, Column VII) is considerably higher than in the population (69% versus 49%). Apparently, males take household financial decisions more often than females do. Notes: Column III summarizes the two-sided t-test results of a comparison of the sample means of respondents with a voluntary deductible of €0 (shown in Column I) and individuals with a voluntary deductible higher than €0 (shown in Column II). ** and * indicate that the null of equal sample means is rejected at the 99% and 95% confidence level, respectively.
Results and discussion
We estimate both probit and ordered probit specifications of Equation (1). The results are presented in Table 4 . The first four columns show the probit results; the last four columns give the ordered probit results. As there are only minor differences between the probit and ordered probit results, for example in terms of statistical significance, we discuss them jointly. 9 We have verified that selection does not bias our results by estimating a Heckman selection model, with variables age, partner, number of children and education explaining the willingness to respond to the survey. These estimation results are available from the authors upon request. Starting with the risk variables, we find that these variables mostly have the expected signs, yet are not statistically significant or only marginally significant. In the probit specifications only gender seems a relevant risk driver. The null hypothesis that all risk proxies are irrelevant to deductible choice cannot be rejected at conventional confidence levels for the probit specifications. 10 In the ordered probit estimations, the number of GP visits is also statistically significant. Columns III and VII show that the young men dummy is insignificant in both the probit and the order probit specification. This result is hard to reconcile with expected utility theory, since the expected out-ofpocket expenditures of young men are clearly below average. It is, however, consistent with the population data described in Section 2. In the population, the percentage of young men with a nonzero voluntary deductible is just slightly higher than the corresponding fraction in the overall population (8% versus 5%).
Turning to the risk preference variables, we observe that on the whole these variables have the expected sign (positive) and are highly significant. The null hypothesis that all risk preference proxies are statistically irrelevant to deductible choice is clearly rejected for all specifications. 11 Financial risk tolerance and wealth are both significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, job risk and smoking behavior are also found to be significant determinants of deductible choice, even though self-employed individuals face greater background risk and despite increasing public awareness of the negative health effects and associated costs of smoking. The importance of our risk preference proxies in the regression results is especially noteworthy since these proxies have also been found to be relevant in decision making when the stakes are much larger (e.g., Barsky et al. 1997; Guiso and Paiella 2008 ).
We will return to this point below. Note that in all specifications the background variables are insignificant and thus appear unimportant to deductible choice. In the probit specifications, the dependent is 1 for individuals with a voluntary deductible higher than €0, and 0 otherwise. In the ordered probit specifications the dependent is voluntary deductible choice, which ranges from to €0 to €500. Estimated cut points of the ordered probit specification are not shown. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significantly different from zero at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence level, respectively.
To gauge the economic importance of risk preferences and risk type in decision making about deductibles, Table 5 gives predicted probabilities for the average individual, for relative low risk individuals, and for relatively risk tolerant individuals. These predicted probabilities are based on the estimation results shown in Columns I and V in Table 4 . The average individual and the low risk type (risk tolerant type) differ only with respect to the stated risk type proxies (risk tolerance proxies).
Compared to the average individual, a young man of 30 years old has -ceteris paribus -a slightly higher probability of choosing a nonzero voluntary deductible (18.3% versus 14.5%). The probability that a self-employed, smoking individual chooses a nonzero voluntary deductible is estimated at about 30%, which is more than twice that of the average adult. This probability increases further with 21 financial risk tolerance and wealth, to above 50%. Hence risk preferences have a significantly greater impact on deductible choice than risk type, both statistically and quantitatively. Note: The probabilities are predicted using the probit and ordered probit regression results given in Columns I and V of Table 4 , respectively. The predictions for the average individual (shown in row 1) deviate from the sample proportions in each deductible choice category because (ordered) probit models are nonlinear.
Since premium rebates differ between health insurers, we use information on the rebates offered by the different health insurers to verify the robustness of our findings. Specifically, we construct a dummy variable which is 1 if the rebate offered for a voluntary deductible of €500 is higher than the expected costs, and 0 otherwise. The expected costs of a voluntary deductible of €500 are as shown in Figure 2 . As not all panelists specified their basic health insurer, we lose 136 observations. Table 6 shows the results of this robustness exercise. For brevity's sake, only the estimated coefficients for the risk and risk preference variables are shown. The newly constructed dummy has the right sign, yet is statistically insignificant. The risk preference variables keep their significance and thus this robustness exercise further underpins our results.
The above findings contrast with the standard expected utility of wealth model in two respects. First, we find, at the most, modest evidence of adverse selection, while in the classical model, risk type is the only eligible driver of deductible choice. Exemplarily, in this respect, is the deductible choice behavior of young men. From the population data we know that for the average young man it is clearly beneficial in expected value terms to choose a high voluntary deductible. In practice, however, very few young men choose to do so, both in the population and in our sample. Indeed, we find that 22 statistically, young men do not have a significantly higher probability of choosing a nonzero voluntary deductible than average. Our regression analyses suggest that this is caused by risk preference, or more specifically, risk aversion. This brings us to our second contrasting finding, namely that risk preferences are a key determinant of deductible choice. This finding contrasts with the classical theory's prediction of local risk neutrality. While classical expected utility of wealth models, either with or without consumption commitments, fail to fully rationalize risk aversion over small stakes, so-called reference-dependent utility models actually predict such preferences (KĘszegi and Rabin 2006, 2007) . In reference-dependent models, which build from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1992) , risky prospects are evaluated in isolation. Such decision-making has been labeled narrow framing, narrow bracketing, or myopia (Rabin and Thaler 2001) . If small stake gambles are indeed evaluated in isolation and around a specific reference point, decision-making is dominated by gain-loss utility instead of the classical notion of outcome-based utility. The reference point is typically the status quo, which is being insured and having a €0 voluntary deductible in the current context, given the mandatory nature of basic health insurance and the low demand for nonzero voluntary deductibles. With this reference point, the payment of health insurance premium is planned and therefore not evaluated as a loss. Out-of-pocket expenses are, however, evaluated as losses. This brings us to a final important ingredient of referencedependent utility models: loss aversion, i.e. agents are more sensitive to losses than they are to equivalent gains (e.g. Diecidue and Wakker 2001) . In such a set-up, people are expected to be significantly risk averse over modest stakes.
An appealing aspect of the . Ęszegi and Rabin (2007) model is that it simultaneously allows for risk aversion over small and large stakes. This is because a person's utility is assumed to be the sum of outcome-based utility and gain-loss utility. Indeed, with wealth level w and reference wealth level where ) (⋅ m is classical outcome-based utility, and ) (⋅ μ represents gain-loss utility. Since outcomebased utility is approximately linear over small stakes, gain-loss utility dominates decision-making in the small. Over material stakes, however, decision-making is determined by the outcome-based part of a person's utility. Consequently, over large stakes risk aversion is driven by the traditional mechanism of diminishing marginal utility of wealth, while over small stakes risk aversion is the result of loss aversion.
Combining our results with existing empirical results, it appears that risk attitudes over small and large stakes are closely related, or manifestations of the same preferences in different domains. This is because the risk preference proxies we use to explain deductible choice have been found, by others, to 25 be relevant determinants of choice behavior over much larger stakes. For example, Guiso and Paiella (2006) find that lifetime wealth (i.e. the sum of financial wealth and income) and job risk are positively related to risk tolerance over stakes in the order of €5000 (approximately a factor 10 of the stakes in deductible choice). Bertaut (1998) and Alessie, Hochguertal, and Van Soest (2004) show that equity ownership increases with wealth. Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry (2008) find that smokers are less likely to buy acute health insurance, leaving them more exposed to substantial financial risk. Hence, it seems that individuals that are more risk tolerant to large stakes are also more risk tolerant to small stakes, and vice versa. Establishing the importance of the relationship between risk taking in the small and in the large is an interesting topic for future research.
Conclusion
We use population and survey data on deductible choice in Dutch universal health insurance to analyze risk preferences over small stakes. The unique institutional characteristics of this insurance market enable us to investigate small stakes risk taking in a real life setting. Health insurers in the Netherlands are obliged to accept all residents at community-rated premiums, and Dutch residents are obliged to buy the basic health insurance policy. Consequently, risk selection by health insurers is impossible and consumer choice is restricted to choosing a health insurer and a deductible-rebate package with that insurer.
According to standard expected utility theory, people are approximately risk neutral over small stakes.
In this paper we provide new field evidence that contrasts with this implication of the classical model of choice under uncertainty. Corrected for risk type, we find that more risk tolerant individuals are significantly more likely to opt for a nonzero voluntary deductible, and vice versa. Our results also indicate that a significant part of the population tends to over-insure. Exemplarily in this respect is the choice behavior of young men (under 44 years old) . From the population data we know that for the average young man it is clearly beneficial in expected value terms to choose the highest voluntary 26 deductible (€500). In practice, however, very few choose to do so. Indeed, we find that young men do not have a significantly higher probability of choosing a nonzero voluntary deductible than men in general. The regression results strongly suggest that this is caused by risk aversion.
Risk aversion over small stakes can be rationalized by reference-dependent utility models, where narrow framing and loss aversion play a pivotal role. The results of this paper suggest that there is value in exploring such utility models further.
